
“The Political Legacy of Colonialism
To understand this phenomenon, one must begin with colonialism and its political legacy. Colonialism in Africa was markedly different from the colonial experiences of the Americas, Europe, and Asia. To begin with, it was unusually statist, The colonial state redistributed land and determined who should produce what and how. It attended to the supply of labor, sometimes resorting to forced labor; it churned out administrative instruments and legislated taxes to induce the breakup of traditional social relations of production, the atomization of society, and the process of proletarianization. It went into the business of education to ensure that workers could do the jobs they were required to perform and would remain steadfast in the performance of their often tedious and disagreeable tasks. It built roads, railways, and ports to facilitate the collection and export of commodities as well as the import of manufactured goods. It sold commodities through commodity boards. Indeed, it controlled every aspect of the colonial economy tightly to maintain its power and domination and to realize the economic objectives of colonization.
Colonialism in Africa was markedly different from the colonial experiences of the Americas, Europe, and Asia. To begin with, it was unusually statist
Since the colonial state was called upon by the peculiar circumstances of the colonial situation to carry out so many functions -indeed to do everything-it was all powerful. It needed to be all powerful not only to carry out its mission but also to survive along with the colonial order in the face of the resentment and the hostility of the colonized, a hostility that occasionally broke out into rebellions such as the Mau Mau insurrection in Kenya.
The power of the colonial state was not only absolute but arbitrary. For instance, the colonial governments made the colonies produce the commodities they needed. When the Gold Coast (now Ghana) was colonized, it did not farm cocoa. The colonial government decided that the country would be suitable ground for farming cocoa and duly introduced the crop. In 1865 the country started exporting cocoa, and by 1901 it was the leading producer of the commodity in the world. It quickly became a monocultural cocoa economy; by 1939 cocoa accounted for 80 percent of the value of its exports. In Kenya, the Coffee Plantation Registration Ordinance of 1918 forbade the growing of coffee, the country’s most profitable commodity, by Africans. The purpose was to make Africans available for wage labor by keeping them from becoming independent producers as well as to prevent them from stealing coffee from European farms by ensuring they could not legally possess coffee. Other examples of arbitrariness include the reservation of the White Highlands in Kenya for European farmers and the Marketing of Native Produce Ordinance of 1935, which restricted wholesale marketing to Europeans and barred Africans.
…the colonial governments made the colonies produce the commodities they needed. When the Gold Coast (now Ghana) was colonized, it did not farm cocoa. The colonial government decided that the country would be suitable ground for farming cocoa and duly introduced the crop. In 1865 the country started exporting cocoa, and by 1901 it was the leading producer of the commodity in the world. It quickly became a monocultural cocoa economy; by 1939 cocoa accounted for 80 percent of the value of its exports.
These two features of state power, its absolutism and its arbitrariness, framed colonial politics. As if to underscore the arbitrariness of the power of the colonial state, its officials showed hardly any interest in transforming domination into hegemony, beyond the notion that their domination was also a civilizing mission. The colonial situation was not unlike Hobbes’s prepolitical state, in which all claims are arbitrary and all rights are only powers. In the essentially military situation of imposing and maintaining colonial domination, the colonizers had no choice but to reject in principle any restrictions on their use of power. There may have been circumstances in which the use of state power was not arbitrary in practice, but it was always arbitrary in principle.
Since the colonial state was for its subjects, at any rate, an arbitrary power, it could not engender any legitimacy even though it made rules and laws profusely and propagated values. Accordingly, in struggling to advance their interests, the colonial subjects did not worry about conforming to legality or legitimacy norms. Colonial politics was thus reduced to the crude mechanics of opposing forces driven by the calculus of power. For everyone in this political arena, security lay only in the accumulation of power. The result was an unprecedented drive for power; power was made the top priority in all circumstances and sought by all means. As the rulers and subordinates extended their rights to their powers, the idea of lawful political competition became impossible, and politics was inevitably reduced to a single issue: the determination of two exclusive claims to rulership. This politics hardly encouraged moderation and compromise.
Since the colonial state was for its subjects, at any rate, an arbitrary power, it could not engender any legitimacy even though it made rules and laws profusely and propagated values. Accordingly, in struggling to advance their interests, the colonial subjects did not worry about conforming to legality or legitimacy norms.
The Postcolonial Situation
Although political independence brought some change to the composition of the state managers, the character of the state remained much as it was in the colonial era. It continued to be totalistic in scope, constituting a statist economy. It presented itself as an apparatus of violence, had a narrow social base, and relied for compliance on coercion rather than authority.
With few exceptions, the gaining of independence was not a matter of the nationalists’ marshaling forces to defeat colonial regimes. More often than not, it was a matter of the colonizers’ accepting the inevitable and orchestrating a handover of government to their chosen African successors, successors who could be trusted to share their values and be attentive to their interests. This approach did not succeed in all places where the decolonization was peaceful, much less where it was occasioned by revolutionary struggle. But on the whole, political independence in Africa was rarely the heroic achievement it was made out to be; it was often a convenience of deradicalization by accommodation, a mere racial integration of the political elite.
Although political independence brought some change to the composition of the state managers, the character of the state remained much as it was in the colonial era. It continued to be totalistic in scope, constituting a statist economy. It presented itself as an apparatus of violence, had a narrow social base, and relied for compliance on coercion rather than authority.
With few exceptions, the gaining of independence was not a matter of the nationalists’ marshaling forces to defeat colonial regimes. More often than not, it was a matter of the colonizers’ accepting the inevitable and orchestrating a handover of government to their chosen African successors … on the whole, political independence in Africa was rarely the heroic achievement it was made out to be; it was often a convenience of deradicalization by accommodation, a mere racial integration of the political elite.
The tendency to reproduce the past was reinforced by the dispositions of the dominant social forces in the postcolonial era. None of them apparently had any serious interest in transformation, and all of them were only too aware that they could not afford to broaden the social base of state power. What changed over time was the proliferation and intensification of conflict within the nationalist coalition. Class conflict became more salient with the indigenization of the political elite and matured rapidly. It was deepened by the inevitable depoliticization of the nationalist movement to contain frustrations arising from the failure to effect the societal transformation that many had hoped for and fought for. As is clear from many speeches and writings of nationalist leaders, such as Kwame Nkrumah’s “I Speak for Freedom,” A. A. Nwafor Orizu’s “Renascent Africa,” and Jomo Kenyatta’s “Facing Mount Kenya,” the language of nationalism had been radical, propounding distributive, egalitarian, and democratic values.
The nationalist movement was essentially a coalition of disparate groups united by their common grievances against colonial oppression. It was typically a network of nationalities, ethnic groups, religious organizations, syncretistic movements, secondary organizations, and professional interest groups.1 But even though they cooperated against the colonial regime, their relationship was never free from tension and conflict.
As the prospects for political independence improved, the solidarity of the movement grew weaker and competition between its component units became more intense. Although the members of the coalition fought against the colonial power, they worried about the enormous power they were trying to wrestle from it, power they could not entrust to any one of them or even share in a way that could reduce political anxiety, The normative, institutional, and ideological mechanisms that would have made this power subject to constitutional constraints and accountability did not yet exist. So while agitating to overthrow the colonial regime, the constituent elements of the coalition were also trying to block one another from appropriating it. Increasingly their attention turned from the colonial regime to one another, and eventually the competition among these groups came to dominate Political life, while the colonial power, now resigned to the demise Of colonialism, became a referee rather than the opponent.
As the prospects for political independence improved, the solidarity of the movement grew weaker and competition between its component units became more intense.
By the time independence was achieved in the early 1960s, the centrifugal tendencies had grown strong enough in many countries (for instance ,Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Uganda, Cameroon, and Zaire) threaten not Only the transition to independence but, more important, the political viability of the new governments in trying to deal with these forces of disunity, some African countries, like Nigeria, came to independence with such complex constitutions that systemic breakdown was inevitable.
But for the Purpose here, which is to understand the Postcolonial state and the politics associated with it, what is pertinent is not so much centrifugalism as the political competition arising from the mutual alienation of the coalition partners. As they Pulled apart, they placed more value on capturing Political power for themselves and grew increased fearful about what seemed to them to be the grave consequences of losing to their rivals in the competition for the control of state Power. Thus the premium on Political Power rose higher and higher and with it the intensity of political competition and its domination by efficiency norms.
The Political leaders, too, were exposed to new conflicts. The increasing competition and conflict among nationalities, ethnic groups, and communal and interest groups was reflected in their ranks. They also tended to separate along those lines; indeed, many of them had sought Power by Politicizing national, ethnic, and communal formations. Now in office, some of them manipulated ethnic and communal loyalties as a way to deradicalize their followers and contain the emerging class division of political society, which could isolate and destroy them. So they began to place emphasis on vertical solidarities across class lines. In particular, they tried to establish mutual identity and common cause by appealing to national, ethnic, communal, and even religious loyalties.
The Political leaders, too, were exposed to new conflicts. … many of them had sought Power by Politicizing national, ethnic, and communal formations. Now in office, some of them manipulated ethnic and communal loyalties as a way to deradicalize their followers and contain the emerging class division of political society, which could isolate and destroy them. So they began to place emphasis on vertical solidarities across class lines.
In doing so, they weakened the solidarity of the people, at a great cost. They created not only strong divisions within their own ranks but strong antipathies and exclusivity in society. As always, the exclusivity of the competing political formations increased the premium on Political power and the intensity of political competition.
Political intensity was further reinforced by the tendency to use state power for accumulation. This practice was associated with the weak material base of the new political leaders, who had be, economically marginalized by the discriminatory economic policies of the colonial regime. Even when they came to power, they had little experience of entrepreneurial activity and little or no capital. Invariably they were obliged to explore the one leverage they had: control of state power to strengthen their material base.
The need for a more secure material base drove the indigenous elite to increase the statism of the economy. An increasing range of economic activities was brought under the control of the state, notably by nationalization, to facilitate the appropriation of wealth by means of state power, The use of state power for accumulation, associated as it is with statism, monopoly power, and the interposition of coercion in the labor process, raised to new heights the premium on the capture of state power.
The need for a more secure material base drove the indigenous elite to increase the statism of the economy.
Finally, political intensity received additional impetus from the alienation of leaders from followers in the postcolonial era. Basically the political elite dealt with the tide of popular discontent arising from the deradicalization of the nationalist movement by enforcing political conformity through coercion. Coercion was used to constrain the political expression of the masses, now disillusioned with the performance of their leaders. Coercion was also used to impose “political unity” in the midst of considerable social pluralism, which had become very divisive for being politicized and exploited by competing elites.
The dominant faction of the political elite found itself utterly isolated, increasingly relying on violence, at war with the rest of society and with rival factions among its own ranks. Political competition now assumed the character of warfare and paved the way for the ascendancy of the specialists of violence, the military. The rash of military coups that came later essentially formalized a reality that was already firmly established. It was not the military that caused military rule in Africa by intervening in politics; rather, it was the character of politics that engendered military rule by degenerating into warfare, inevitably propelling the specialists of warfare to the lead role.
The dominant faction of the political elite found itself utterly isolated, increasingly relying on violence, at war with the rest of society and with rival factions among its own ranks. Political competition now assumed the character of warfare and paved the way for the ascendancy of the specialists of violence, the military. The rash of military coups that came later essentially formalized a reality that was already firmly established. It was not the military that caused military rule in Africa by intervening in politics; rather, it was the character of politics that engendered military rule by degenerating into warfare, inevitably propelling the specialists of warfare to the lead role.
To recapitulate, at independence the form and function of the state in Africa did not change much for most countries in Africa. State power remained essentially the same: immense, arbitrary, often violent, always threatening. Except for a few countries such as Botswana, politics remained a zero-sum game; power was sought by all means and maintained by all means. Colonial rule left most of Africa a legacy of intense and lawless political competition amidst an ideological void and a rising tide of disenchantment with the expectation of a better life.”
– Claude Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa, 1996, pages 1-6
Image: Material by Umberto Boccioni, 1912















